



GNSI DECISION BRIEF

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September 4, 2024



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Future of the Abraham Accords

Introduction

In 2020, the United States facilitated a series of landmark accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Morocco, Bahrain, and Sudan, marking a historic shift in Middle Eastern and North African geopolitics.^[i] 2020, when the UAE and Israel announced the normalization of

House. This was quickly followed by similar agreements between Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Abraham Accords included the exchange of ambassadors, the opening of embassies, and collaboration across various economic and security sectors, symbolizing a strategic realignment in regional relationships. These accords paved the way for enhanced economic, cultural, and strategic partnerships.

Background

The announcement of diplomatic ties between the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan with Israel elicited mixed reactions globally. Leaders within the region welcomed the potential for increased engagement, others viewed it as a betrayal, arguing it undermined

^[ii] Critics of the agreements also voiced concerns about the continued marginalization of the Palestinian cause and its potential impact on the broader Middle East peace process by fragmentating the Arab bloc and delaying a resolution on the core issue. Palestinian leaders and citizens feared that the normalization of economic deals might lessen international pressure on Israel to address longstanding grievances.^[iii] Beyond the Middle East, the agreements sparked

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its diplomatic foothold in west Africa. Meanwhile, Sudan renewed its ties with Iran vis-à-vis the UAE, and the Sudanese Armed Forces appear to have acquired Iranian attack drones and anti-tank

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^[ii] Amira Schiff and Chen Kertcher, "Silent alliances and shifting tides: unveiling the hidden pathways to resolving interstate rivalries—the UAE-Israel case," *International Journal of Conflict Management* 10.1108/IJCM-01-2023-0006.

^[iii] " 'Stab in the Back': Palestinians condemn Israel-Bahrain Deal," *Foreign Affairs*, September 11, 2020, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2020/09/11/palestinians-condemn-israel-bahrain-deal>.

^[iv] Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, September 15, 2020, <https://www.pcpsr.org/press-releases/2020/09/15/palestinians-condemn-israel-bahrain-deal>.

^[v] "Israel, Bahrain ink agriculture agreement," *Foreign Affairs*, October 20, 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2022/10/20/israel-bahrain-ink-agriculture-agreement>; "Morocco & Israel step up cooperation in smart & green farming," *Foreign Affairs*, October 21, 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2022/10/21/morocco-israel-to-step-up-cooperation-in-smart-green-farming>;

^[vi] "Israel Jordan to partner in water for energy deal," *Reuters*, November 22, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/israel-jordan-partner-water-for-energy-deal-israeli-ministry-says-2021-11-22/>;

^[vii] <https://www.aapeaceinstitute.org/latest/trade-and-tourism-on-the-rise-among-abraham-accords-states>

^[viii] UAE Ministry of Economy, "UAE-Israel Comprehensive Partnership Agreement," https://www.moec.gov.ae/en/cepa_israel.

^[ix] Steven Scheer, "Bahrain aims to use closer ties to tap Israel's tech expertise," *Reuters*, September 7, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/bahrain-aims-to-use-closer-ties-to-tap-israels-tech-expertise-2023-09-07/>.

^[x] *Foreign Affairs*

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